In wealthy nations around the world, the rise of the knowledge economy has increased political and economic divides that fuel right-wing populism. These divides generally have a strong geographic dimension, and the United States is no exception. Dense metro locales—advantaged in the knowledge economy—have shifted toward the Democratic Party. More sparsely populated nonmetro places—disadvantaged by this profound economic transformation—have shifted toward the Republican Party.

This growing geospatial divide mirrors and motivates many others, cleaving voters across lines of education, occupation, race, ethnicity, religion, age, and immigration status. It divides those who welcome a global knowledge economy and increased social diversity from those who feel threatened by them. In turn, this divide fuels the two political parties’ increasingly distinct appeals, strategies, and orientations toward democracy.

During the Biden administration, major new investments were launched through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Act, CHIPS and Science Act, and Inflation Reduction Act. Many of them flowed to nonmetro America. Between 2021 and late 2024, red counties received more than 73% of announced private strategic-sector investments — more than twice their share of economic output. These policies, alongside a vigorous fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic, fueled a faster recovery in the United States than seen in other rich countries — and lower-wage workers and slower-growth regions benefited. Coming out of the pandemic, the most distressed U.S. counties experienced increased job growth, particularly in strategic sectors.

Yet the hopes for “deliverism” were dashed in the 2024 general election. Democrats did not gain ground in nonmetro America, nor among White working-class voters, and a right-wing populist party seized power. What happened, and what lessons should be taken for the future?

In this policy brief, we first describe the shifting coalitional bases of America’s two major parties and how they are related to political-economic geography. Then, we consider how this has fed into the transformation of the Republican Party and the rise of plutocratic populism. Finally, we examine the economic and political effects of Democrats’ response during the Biden administration, focusing on their implications for future political and policy strategies to reduce regional inequalities and blunt the effectiveness of right-wing populism.

About the authors

Jacob S. Hacker

Director, American Political Economy eXchange, and Professor of Political Science, Yale

Paul Pierson

Paul Pierson

Director and Research Lead, Capitalism & Democracy

Paul Pierson is the director of the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative and the John Gross Distinguished Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley. He also serves as the co-director of the multi-university Consortium on American Political Economy (CAPE).

His research, which focuses on the American political economy and public policy, has been awarded several major prizes from the American Political Science Association. He is the author or co-author of seven books, including the best-selling Winner Take All Politics, one of four books he has written with Jacob Hacker. His latest book, with Eric Schickler, is Partisan Nation: The Dangerous New Logic of American Politics in a Nationalized Era.  

Pierson is a regular commentator on public affairs, whose work has appeared in The New York Times, The New York Times Magazine, The Washington PostThe New York Review of Books, and Foreign Affairs. A member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Pierson is a former Guggenheim Fellow, Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute, and Russell Sage Foundation Fellow. He also served as co-director of the Successful Societies Program of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR).