Sparking adaptation: The politics of reforming effective interconnection regimes in Massachusetts and New York

As the U.S. grapples with the urgent need to speed clean energy deployment to meet net zero targets, interconnection delays are a major obstacle to achieving an energy transition. Increasing delays and costs are only in part related to the rising rate of deployment; ineffective interconnection regimes also play a significant role, which can be linked to perverse incentive structures, absence of proactive approaches, mismatched institutional design and norms such as serial study, or outdated cost sharing approaches. Nevertheless, some policy subsystems have managed to break through barriers to create relatively more effective and innovative interconnection regimes.

The main research question guiding this article is: Why do some states manage to overcome political barriers to adapt interconnection regimes to be relatively more effective?

To answer this question, the article utilizes comparative case studies of effective distribution interconnection regimes in New York and Massachusetts to examine the role of three change factors — political coalitions, administrative technical capacity, and policy windows — in enabling policy subsystems to avoid policy drift and successfully adapt. The cases reveal two key findings:

1. When administrative technical capacity is constrained and policy windows are closed, political coalitions strengthened their approach by utilizing innovative strategies, like leveraging external political networks to increase issue salience.
2. The creation of a policy broker role with adequate authority and legitimacy, such as an Ombudsperson, can drive consensus through informal processes and improve the overall ease regulatory reform through formal pathways.